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In conclusion, it can only be said that the problem seems to revolve
around the extent to which the courts will accept the legislative determination that prices of barbers bear a real and substantial relation to the
public health and welfare.
BOB C. SIGLER.

AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN A CRIMINAL ACTION
"The law imposes upon the state in criminal prosecution the burden
of proving the case set forth. in the indictment or information, in all its
material parts, beyond a reasonable doubt. . . ."I In the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, unlike the Continental system ,the parties themselves apportion the task of abducing evidence.2 They must apprise themselves of both the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with
the evidence. Thus in criminal cases the state, as heretofore mentioned,
must assume the former burden beyond a reasonable doubt if a conviction
is to stand; in civil cases the plaintiff assumes the same burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
Preponderance and reasonable doubt are of course not synonymous
terms-$ The distinction had its origin about the end of the 1700's and was
first applied in capital cases. 4 But where the accused in a criminal action
interposes an affirmative defense this distinction seems to become less
clear, according to some decisions.
The courts are not in agreement as to what in fact constitutes an
affirmative defense. The term has been defined as "some distinct substantive ground of defense to a criminal charge, not necessary to a prosecution
on which the indictment is founded," 5 or "facts wholly disconnected from
the body of the particular offense charged." 6 Such defense is matter not
7
covered by pleas of guilty, not guilty and former conviction or acquittal.
Alibi has been said to be an affirmative defense, 8 as well as the contrary. 9
The discord may stem in part from the fact that particular matter may
constitute an affirmative defense under some circumstances while not so
under others. An exception within a statute may be part of the offense,
in which instance the state will plead and prove it, or it may be an excuse
or justification providing an affirmative defense1 0 to be pleaded and proved
by defendant. An exception is part of the offense when it qualifies the
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offense charged or is part of its description or definition. For example,
in a prosecution under an abortion statute, the exception, "unless the
same be necessary to preserve her life," was held a constituent element of
the offense and must be proved as a necessary part of the state's case." It
is a defense when proof of it relieves defendant of criminal liability. Thus
under a statute prohibiting transportation of garbage without a license,
unless the one so transporting was a householder, that defendant was a
2
householder transporting his own garbage was an affirmative defense.'
And confining a defense to the original transactions on which the charge is
founded will not give rise to an affirmative defense.' 3
Insanity, 14 duress, 15 self-defense, 10 prior jeopardy, 17 intoxication,' 8
asphasis,' 9 entrapment,2 0 exceptions under the circumstances before mentioned, 2 ' the defense of a wife's adultery interposed to a criminal action for
non-support of the wife, 22 and the defense of killing another's dog to protect accused's smaller dog, 23 have all been held to be affirmative defenses.
If the defense is affirmative (or positive24 as sometimes called) the
effect upon a criminal case may be threefold. First, it is said that such
defense may be outside the bounds of the regular pleas and defendant
must bring it in by a special plea. 25 It is not a denial of the allegations of
the information.2 6 Secondly, some courts hold that defendant then assumes
the burden of going forward with the evidence, 27 though the burden of
proof does not shift.28 And last, irr conflict with the foregoing, other
courts hold that the defendant then assumes the burden of proof.29 The
state first must make out a prima facie case before the latter two requirements apply.30 If on appeal a defense is held to be affirmative, and the
accused did not assume either burden in the trial court, he will be convicted. Therefore, he must orginally ascertain this fact at his peril. Failure
to assume the burden of proof also accounts for the fact that the quantum
of proof of such defense is not defined in many cases because an instruction
was not given in the court below.81
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The courts have encountered great difficulty in ascertaining the quantum of such proof to be required when an affirmative defense has been
pleaded. This is especially true of the defense of insanity. Where insanity
has been interposed as a defense it has sometimes been held that it must
be established by a preponderance of the evidence,8 2 but other courts have
instructed that, if upon the whole evidence the jury entertain a reasonable
doubt as to sanity, they must acquit.3 3 One state has declared by statute
34
Thus, there
that insanity must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
are two major points of view, which can be reconciled in part. The courts
of the first persuasion begin with the presumption that everyone is sane
until the contrary is shown, and that when the commission of a crime is
admitted or clearly proved, and insanity is alleged as a defense, it being
an independent, affirmative defense, and opposed to the natural order of
3 5
things, it must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Courts
of the latter persuasion begin with the presumption that everyone is innocent, that the burden of proving all elements of crime rests on the state
and never shifts; and that, when the defendant's sanity is put in issue, the
state must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, because, without a mind'
capable of crime, there can be no crime committed.
With the affirmative defenses other than insanity, the presumption of
innocence alone is to be overcome; still the decisions fall into the same
two main categories as to quantum of proof. The courts holding that defendant must establish his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the
evidence reason that defendant has admitted the state's prima facie case,
but seeks to avoid criminal liability because of justifying or mitigating
circumstances. Invocation of the positive defense assumes that the act
charged as a public offense was committed.3 6 The presumption of innocence has been overcome, and if the case were to rest at this point defendant
would be found guilty. The burden of proof has shifted. It is likened
to confession and avoidance in a civil action at common law. Defendant
must then go forward with the evidence as well as sustain the burden of
proof as to his defense. This amounts to compelling accused to prove his
innocence.
Under the "reasonable doubt" rule, the defendant has the benefit of
the presumption of innocence throughout the case, for the rule is founded
on that presumption. "Reasonable doubt 'isthat state of the case which,
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves
the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction ... of the truth of the charge ....," The state's prima
facie case does not affect the burden of proof but relates only to what may
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be called the burden of going forward with the evidence, or more accurately, the risk of non-persuasion.3 8 The burden of proving defendant guilty
of the crime as charged remains with the prosecution throughout the case.
Though defendant must introduce some evidence, it is sufficient that his
evidence create a doubt in the minds of the jury.3 9 Evidence sufficient to
raise such doubt may fall short, equal, or be in excess of that evidence
required to prove the defense by the preponderance rule.
The problem is quite controversial. It is the writer's opinion that
the reasonable doubt rule is the better rule. The presumption of innocence
should continue throughout the trial, and the state should have the burden
of proving guilt.40 This rule was followed by the Wyoming Supreme
Court where the defense of insanity was interposed. 41 By following the
rule of preponderance of evidence as to affirmative defenses, the court must
instruct as to both rules in any criminall action. Instructions on two different quanta of proof only serve to confuse the jury and to compel the
defendant to assume a greater burden than required. Moreover, the distinction between civil and criminal cases tends to become obliterated. But
perhaps in practice it is not of such great moment after all. As the Supreme
Court of Washington once said, "The distinction between the quantum of
proof necessary to raise a reasonable doubt and that necessary to constitute a
fair preponderance of the evidence is more fanciful than real. When evidence
is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as such doubt is usually defined
and understood, it may also be said in a sense to preponderate. The dis42
tinction ... is of little value."
OSCAR A. HALL.
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